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Abstract 
 
An April 2015 World Bank report on attainment of the Millennium Development Goal (MDG) 
extreme poverty target has revealed that extreme poverty has been decreasing in all regions of 
the world with the exception of sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), in spite of the sub-region enjoying 
more than two decades of growth resurgence.  This study builds on a critic of Piketty’s ‘capital 
in the 21
st
 century’ and recent methodological innovations on reverse Solow-Swan to review 
empirics on the adoption of common policy initiatives against a cause of extreme poverty in 
SSA: capital flight. The richness of the dataset enables the derivation of 14 fundamental 
characteristics of African capital flight based on income-levels, legal origins, natural resources, 
political stability, regional proximity and religious domination. The main finding reveals that 
regardless of fundamental characteristic, from a projection date of 2010, a genuine timeframe for 
harmonizing policies is between 2016 and 2023. In other words, the beginning of the psot-2015 
agenda on sustainable development goals coincides with the timeframe for common capital flight 
policies.  
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1.  Introduction 
 
 There are at least four reasons for reviewing Asongu (2014) on ‘Fighting African Capital 
Flight: Empirics on Benchmarking Policy Harmonization’: (i) recent disturbing extreme poverty 
trends in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA); (ii) a critic of Piketty’s ‘capital in the 21st century’ that 
builds on capital flight to elucidate the sub-region’s extreme poverty tragedy; (iii) a recent 
methodological innovation for common policy initiatives based on negative macroeconomic and 
institutional signals (reverse Solow-Swan) and (iv) the imperative to account for more 
fundamental characteristics of the sub-region’s development in order to avail room for 
robustness and more policy implications.  
 First, an April 2015 World Bank report on attainment of the Millennium Development 
Goal (MDG) extreme poverty target has revealed that extreme poverty has been decreasing in all 
regions of the world, with the exception of Africa, where 45% of countries in SSA are 
substantially off-track from achieving the MDG extreme poverty target (World Bank, 2015). As 
shown in Figure 1 below, whereas extreme poverty has been declining in all regions of the 
world, it has unfortunately been increasing in SSA. This is despite over two decades of growth 
resurgence that began in the mid 1990s.  
 Second, building on the increasing poverty levels in SSA, Asongu (2016) has presented a 
critic of Piketty’s (2013) ‘capital in the 21st century’. Building on: (i) responses from Kenneth 
Rogoff  and Joseph Stiglitz; (ii) post Washington Consensus paradigms and (iii) underpinnings 
from Boyce-Fofack-Ndikumana  and Solow-Swan, the study concludes that extreme poverty in 
SSA would increase as long as the return on political economy (or illicit capital flight) is higher 
than the growth rate in the sub-region.  
 Third, a recent stream of literature is building on theoretical underpinnings of 
neoclassical growth models to propose the need for common policies based on negative 
macroeconomic and institutional signals. In essence, whereas the theoretical underpinnings of 
income convergence have exclusively been limited to catch-up in positive signals, a new stream 
of literature is evolving on catch-up in negative signals. According to this stream, it is more 
relevant to initiate common policies based on negative signals because these are policy 
syndromes by conception and definition. The three studies in this stream of literature are to the 
best of our knowledge: (i) Asongu (2013) on harmonizing policies against software piracy; (ii) 
Asongu and Nwachukwu (2015) who have predicted the 2011 Spring using negative signals in 
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institutional and macroeconomic variables and (iii) Asongu (2014) on benchmarking policy 
harmonization against capital flight in SSA. 
 Fourth, Asongu (2014) has used two fundamental characteristics to project horizons for 
common policies against capital flight in SSA. We extend the underlying study by accounting for 
income levels, legal origins, regional proximity and religious domination. In essence, accounting 
for more fundamental characteristics of the sub-region’s development is essential in order to 
avail room for robustness and more policy implications. Accordingly, upholding blanket policies 
in the battle against capital fight may not be effective unless they are contingent on fundamental 
characteristics and prevailing trajectories of capital flight in SSA. Hence, policy makers are most 
likely to ask the following three questions before considering the harmonization of policies on 
capital flight. (1) Is capital flight converging within SSA? (2) If so, what is the degree and timing 
of the convergence process? (3) For which relevant fundamental characteristics of capital flight 
do answers to the first and second questions apply? While an answer to the first question will 
guide on the feasibility of harmonizing blanket policies, the answer to the second will determine 
an optimal timeframe for the blanket policies.  But ultimately, the answer to the third (given that 
the first and second questions are already answered), will determine the feasibility-of, 
timeframe-for and exclusiveness (or non arbitrariness) of the common policies. This third 
question is most relevant because it underlines the need for common policies to be contingent on 
the prevailing speeds of and time for full (100%) convergence within each identified 
fundamental characteristic of capital flight.  
 For the purpose of the study, we assess a sample of 37 African countries with data from: 
(i) African Development Indicators (ADI) and the Financial Development and Structure 
Database (FDSD) of the World Bank (WB) and (ii) Boyce and Ndikumana (2012) for the period 
1980-2010. For brevity and lack of space, the interested reader can refer to further details on the 
theoretical underpinnings, control variables and methodology in the underlying study we are 
reviewing. The selection criteria for additional fundamental characteristics are from recent 
African development literature (Asongu, 2015). The rest of the paper is organized in the 
following manner. The empirical analysis and discussion of results are covered in Section 2 
while Section 3 concludes.  
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Figure 1: Comparative regional poverty levels 
 
 
2. Empirical Analysis  
2.1 Presentation of results 
This section looks at three principal concerns: (i) investigation of the presence of 
convergence; (ii) computation of the speed of convergence and (iii) determination of the time 
needed for full (100%) convergence. The summary of overall findings is presented in Table 1 in 
which the three concerns are addressed. Findings for absolute (unconditional) and conditional 
convergence are presented in Table 2 and Tables 3-4 respectively.  
Absolute convergence is estimated with only the lagged difference of the endogenous 
variable as independent variable whereas conditional convergence is in the presence of the 
conditioning information set (control variables). Hence, unconditional convergence is estimated 
without tiW , : vector of determinants (government expenditure, trade, FDI, GDP growth, 
regulation quality, financial depth, development assistance and inflation) of capital flight
2
. 
Accordingly, in order to assess the validity of the model and indeed the convergence hypothesis, 
we perform two tests, notably: (i) the Sargan-test which assesses the over-identification 
                         
2
 Note should be taken of the fact that, the second vector of determinants entails the second set of control variables 
as presented in Table 4 (public investment, trade, private capital flows, GDP per capita growth, rule of law, liquid 
liabilities, development aid from DAC countries and inflation).  
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restrictions and (ii) the Arellano and Bond test for autocorrelation which examines the null 
hypothesis of no autocorrelation. The Sargan-test investigates if the instruments are uncorrelated 
with the error term in the equation of interest. The null hypothesis is the stance that the 
instruments as a group are strictly exogenous (do not suffer from endogeneity), which is 
necessary for the validity of the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimates. The p-
values of estimated coefficients are disclosed in brackets in the line following the reported values 
of the estimated coefficients. We broadly observe that the null hypothesis of the Sargan test is 
not rejected in all the regressions. Priority is given to the second order autocorrelation: AR(2) 
test in first difference because it is more relevant than AR(1) as it detects autocorrelation in 
difference.  For almost every model, we are unable to reject the AR(2) null hypothesis for the 
absence of autocorrelation, especially for conditional convergence specifications. Therefore, 
there is robust evidence that most of the models are free from autocorrelation at the 1% 
significance level. 
Table 1 presents a summary of the findings from Tables 2-4.  This entails results for 
Absolute Convergence (AC), Conditional Convergence (CC), the Speed of Absolute 
Convergence (SAC), the Speed of Conditional Convergence (SCC) and the rate required to 
achieve full (100%) convergence in both types of convergences.  
From a general perspective, the following conclusions could be drawn. (i) Conditional 
convergence findings based on the second specification (Table 4) are substantially more 
significant than those based on the first specification (Table 3). Therefore, conditional 
convergence is based on the variables we observe and empirically test (or model), which may not 
reflect all determinants of capital flight that facilitate the convergence process. Hence, the 
discussion of findings will be based only on the second specification for conditional 
convergence. (ii) Based on continental results, findings on ‘Petroleum exporting’, ‘North Africa’ 
‘French civil-law’, ‘Middle-income’ and ‘Upper-middle-income’ countries significantly affect 
the absolute convergence process. In other words, these fundamental characteristics have rates of 
convergence that significantly differ from the 33.05% per annum observed for the African 
continent. Their respective degrees of convergence are much lower, implying a corresponding 
lengthier period required for full convergence: with the disparity most pronounced in ‘Middle-
income’ and ‘Upper-middle-income’ countries which both have a 2%  per annum convergence 
rate and a time needed for full convergence of 100 years. (iii) Within the perspective of CC, but 
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for the ‘Conflict-affected’ and ‘Low-income’ countries results, African findings are broadly 
consistent across other fundamental characteristics. (iv) Regardless of fundamental 
characteristic, from a projection date of 2010, a genuine timeframe for harmonizing policies is 
between 2016 and 2023.  
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Table 1: Summary of results on Absolute and Conditional Convergences 
                
 Income Levels Legal Origins  Religious Dom. Regions  Resources  Stability  Africa 
 UMI LMI MI LI English French Christ. Islam SSA NA Oil Non-oil Conflict Non-co.  
 Panel A: Absolute Convergence with Specifications in Table 2 
Absolute C (AC) Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
% of A.C 2% n.a 2% 33.10% 33.05% 12.50% 33.05% n.a 33.05% 17.70% 15.55% 33.05% 33.11% n.a 33.05% 
Years to A.C  100Yrs n.a 100Yrs 6.04Yrs 6.05Yrs 16Yrs 6.05Yrs n.a 6.05Yrs 11.2Yrs 12.8Yrs 6.05Yrs 6.04Yrs n.a 6.05Yrs 
                
 Panel B: Conditional  Convergence with Specifications in Table 3 
Conditional C (CC) No No No No No No No No Yes No No Yes No No No 
% of C.C n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a 11.10% n.a n.a 11.25% n.a n.a n.a 
Years to C.C  n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a 18.1Yr n.a n.a 17.7Yrs n.a n.a n.a 
                
 Panel C: Conditional  Convergence with Specifications in Table 4 
Conditional C (CC) Yes No No Yes No Yes Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
% of C.C 16.6% n.a n.a 20.05% n.a 16.40% 16.40% n.a 16.55% n.a 15.65% n.a 29.75% 16.88% 16.50% 
Years to C.C  12Yrs n.a n.a 9.97Yrs n.a 12.1Yrs 12.1Yrs n.a 12Yrs n.a 12.7Yrs n.a 6.72Yrs 11.8Yrs 12.1Yrs 
                
AC: Absolute Convergence. CC: Conditional Convergence.  Yrs: Years. UMI: Upper Middle Income. LMI: Lower Middle Income. MI: Middle Income. LI: Low Income. English: English Common-
law. French: French Civil-law. Christ: Christianity dominated countries. Islam: Islam dominated countries.  SSA: Sub-Saharan Africa.  NA: North Africa. Oil: Petroleum exporting countries. Non-oil: 
Countries with no significant exports in petroleum. Conflict: Countries with significant political instability. Non-co: Countries without significant political instability. Dom: Domination.  
 
Table 2: Absolute Convergence 
                
 Income Levels Legal Origins  Religious Dom. Regions  Resources  Stability  Africa 
 UMI LMI MI LI English French Christ. Islam SSA NA Oil Non-oil Conflict Non-co.  
Initial  0.04*** 0.092 0.04*** 0.662*** 0.661*** -0.25*** 0.661*** 0.167 0.661*** 0.354** -0.31*** 0.661*** 0.662*** -0.077 0.661*** 
 (0.000) (0.813) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.421) (0.000) (0.030) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.484) (0.000) 
AR(1) 0.994 -1.381 0.939 -1.051 -1.005 -1.078 -1.056 -1.647* -1.057 -1.398 -1.000 -1.009 -1.001 -0.773 -1.057 
 (0.320) (0.167) (0.347) (0.293) (0.314) (0.280) (0.290) (0.099) (0.290) (0.162) (0.317) (0.312) (0.316) (0.439) (0.290) 
AR(2) -0.999 0.676 -0.998 -0.991 -1.010 -0.921 -1.002 0.525 -1.002 -1.244 -1.038 -1.009 -0.999 -0.727 -1.002 
 (0.317) (0.499) (0.318) (0.321) (0.312) (0.357) (0.316) (0.598) (0.316) (0.213) (0.299) (0.312) (0.317) (0.467) (0.316) 
Sargan OIR 4.854 10.928 14.590 7.313 2.567 18.113 11.487 8.424 14.870 3.207 6.594 7.191 6.012 21.551 15.022 
 (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) 
Wald 674*** 0.055 938*** 8e+5*** 2e+6*** 25*** 4e+5*** 0.645 4e+5*** 4.69** 2087*** 2e+6*** 7e+7*** 0.488 442672*** 
 (0.000) (0.813) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.421) (0.000) (0.030) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.484) (0.000) 
Countries  5 11 16 19 15 20 25 10 31 4 8 27 11 24 35 
Observations  70 158 233 271 219 285 359 145 444 60 115 389 161 343 504 
                
***, **,*: significance levels of  1%,  5% and 10% respectively. AR(2): Second Order Autocorrelation test. OIR: Over-identifying Restrictions test. Initial: lagged endogenous estimated coefficient.  
Wald: test for the joint significance of estimated coefficients. AC: Absolute Convergence.  CC: Conditional Convergence.  Yrs: Years. UMI: Upper Middle Income. LMI: Lower Middle Income. MI: 
Middle Income. LI: Low Income. English: English Common-law. French: French Civil-law. Christ: Christianity dominated countries. Islam: Islam dominated countries.  SSA: Sub-Saharan Africa.  NA: 
North Africa. Oil: Petroleum exporting countries.  Non-oil: Countries with no significant exports in petroleum. Conflict: Countries with significant political instability. Non-co: Countries without 
significant political instability. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated coefficients and the Wald statistics. 2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) 
no autocorrelation in the AR(1) and AR(2) tests and; b) the validity of the instruments in the Sargan OIR test. 
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Table 3: Conditional Convergence (First Specification) 
                
 Income Levels Legal Origins  Religious Dom. Regions  Resources  Stability  Africa 
 UMI LMI MI LI English French Christ. Islam SSA NA Oil Non-oil Conflict Non-co.  
Initial  -0.011 -0.130 -0.003 -0.318 -0.015 -0.297 -0.219 0.566 -0.222* 1.247 0.002 -0.22** -0.060 0.005 -0.215 
 (0.932) (0.813) (0.976) (0.398) (0.897) (0.187) (0.158) (0.667) (0.086) (0.451) (0.996) (0.044) (0.940) (0.949) (0.104) 
Constant  0.051 0.013 0.145 -0.072 -0.136 -0.247 -0.0002 -0.073 -0.068 -0.002 -0.043 -0.193* -0.064 0.011 -0.044 
 (0.480) (0.693) (0.618) (0.644) (0.346) (0.430) (0.997) (0.404) (0.620) (0.976) (0.632) (0.097) (0.724) (0.914) (0.695) 
Gov’t  Expenditure  -0.002 -0.0002 -0.008 0.0002 -0.003 0.002 -0.002* 0.001 -0.002 -0.0003 0.0001 -0.0007 -0.0009 -0.004 -0.001 
 (0.897) (0.709) (0.184) (0.939) (0.276) (0.722) (0.074) (0.590) (0.399) (0.441) (0.983) (0.806) (0.735) (0.128) (0.483) 
Trade -0.0004 0.000 -0.0003 0.0003 0.0001 0.001 0.000 0.0003 0.0001 --- 0.001 0.0004 0.002 0.0001 0.000 
 (0.776) (0.933) (0.549) (0.875) (0.775) (0.491) (0.805) (0.804) (0.735)  (0.505) (0.422) (0.585) (0.746) (0.937) 
Foreign Direct Ivt.  --- -0.002 -0.0005 -0.004 0.0002 -0.006 -0.001 -0.005 -0.0001 --- --- -0.0002 --- -0.001 0.001 
  (0.152) (0.838) (0.768) (0.942) (0.715) (0.560) (0.765) (0.970)   (0.929)  (0.755) (0.676) 
GDP Growth  --- 0.007 0.013 0.008 0.017 0.025 0.013 0.015 0.021 --- --- 0.033* --- 0.017 0.019 
  (0.361) (0.631) (0.308) (0.501) (0.270) (0.270) (0.461) (0.304)   (0.055)  (0.401) (0.274) 
Regulation Quality  --- --- -0.020 -0.149 -0.054* -0.090 -0.009 --- -0.041 --- --- -0.019 --- 0.007 -0.04** 
   (0.533) (0.367) (0.078) (0.545) (0.751)  (0.210)   (0.663)  (0.868) (0.043) 
Financial Depth  --- --- -0.094 --- 0.186 0.155 0.095 --- 0.070 --- --- 0.143* --- 0.009 0.048 
   (0.628)  (0.240) (0.620) (0.299)  (0.636)   (0.071)  (0.896) (0.621) 
Foreign Aid  --- --- 0.0004 --- -0.002 -0.000 0.002 --- -0.000 --- --- 0.0005 --- 0.001 -0.0003 
   (0.900)  (0.638) (0.988) (0.256)  (0.989)   (0.875)  (0.664) (0.852) 
Inflation  --- --- -0.003 --- --- --- -0.004* --- -0.001 --- --- -0.001 --- -0.005 -0.001 
   (0.213)    (0.053)  (0.581)   (0.711)  (0.145) (0.421) 
                
AR(1) 0.967 -0.745 -1.364 -0.859 -1.380 -0.935 -1.108 -0.740 -1.247 -0.708 -0.721 -1.285 -0.793 -1.361 -1.242 
 (0.333) (0.455) (0.172) (0.390) (0.167) (0.349) (0.267) ([0.459) (0.212) (0.478) (0.470) (0.198) (0.427) (0.173) (0.213) 
AR(2) -0.885 -0.153 -1.097 0.120 -1.021 -0.088 -0.687 0.543 -0.587 -1.250 0.403 -0.796 0.550 -1.082 -0.643 
 (0.375) (0.877) (0.272) (0.904) (0.307) (0.929) (0.491) (0.587) (0.556) (0.211) (0.686) (0.426) (0.582) (0.278) (0.519) 
Sargan OIR 0.996 5.102 4.923 2.594 2.764 4.918 4.256 2.918 10.621 1.637 3.887 9.110 1.981 10.095 13.395 
Wald 0.207 23.06*** 22.55*** 17.60*** 18.78** 41.6*** 32.89*** 6.620 40.8*** 7.910** 1.228 25.30*** 4.381 21.01** 49.72*** 
 (0.976) (0.000) (0.007) (0.007) (0.016) (0.000) (0.000) (0.250) (0.000) (0.019) (0.746) (0.002) (0.223) (0.012) (0.000) 
Countries  5 9 13 9 11 11 17 7 19 4 5 19 6 17 22 
Observations  73 129 95 56 77 72 114 81 125 60 69 129 77 116 149 
                
***, **,*: significance levels of  1%,  5% and 10% respectively.  AR(2): Second Order Autocorrelation test. OIR: Over-identifying Restrictions test. Initial: lagged endogenous estimated coefficient.  
Wald: test for the joint significance of estimated coefficients. AC: Absolute Convergence.  CC: Conditional Convergence.  Yrs: Years. UMI: Upper Middle Income. LMI: Lower Middle Income. MI: 
Middle Income. LI: Low Income. English: English Common-law. French: French Civil-law. Christ: Christianity dominated countries. Islam: Islam dominated countries.  SSA: Sub-Saharan Africa.  NA: 
North Africa. Oil: Petroleum exporting countries. Non-oil: Countries with no significant exports in petroleum. Conflict: Countries with significant political instability. Non-co: Countries without 
significant political instability. Gov’t: Government. Ivt: Investment. GDP: Gross Domestic Product. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated coefficients and the 
Wald statistics. 2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(1) and AR(2) tests and; b) the validity of the instruments in the Sargan OIR test. 
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Table 4: Conditional Convergence (Second Specification) 
                
 Income Levels Legal Origins  Religious Dom. Regions  Resources  Stability  Africa 
 UMI LMI MI LI English French Christ. Islam SSA NA Oil Non-oil Conflict Non-co.  
Initial  0.33*** 0.357 -0.037 -0.40*** -0.092 -0.32*** -0.32*** 0.292 -0.33*** 0.618 -0.31*** -0.223 0.59*** -0.33*** -0.33*** 
 (0.000) (0.750) (0.654) (0.000) (0.376) (0.000) (0.000) (0.269) (0.000) (0.195) (0.000) (0.124) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant  0.293* 0.053 0.133 -0.617 -0.012 -0.422 -0.263 -0.002 -0.257 0.027 -0.258 -0.097 5.001 0.102 -0.197 
 (0.097) (0.445) (0.364) (0.265) (0.927) (0.454) (0.338) (0.986) (0.323) (0.118) (0.408) (0.308) (0.410) (0.660) (0.455) 
Public  Investment  -0.013 0.002 -0.009 0.032 -0.004 0.003 0.018 0.001 0.024 --- 0.009 -0.005 -0.610 0.022 0.024 
 (0.442) (0.590) (0.246) (0.473) (0.518) (0.901) (0.422) (0.784) (0.453)  (0.444) (0.456) (0.334) (0.516) (0.474) 
Trade -0.002 -0.0003 0.0001 0.023** 0.0001 0.009 0.004 0.0001 0.004 --- 0.007 0.000 0.038 0.001 0.003 
 (0.185) (0.337) (0.634) (0.012) (0.775) (0.106) (0.277) (0.851) (0.255)  (0.295) (0.967) (0.612) (0.558) (0.283) 
Priv.  Capital Flows --- -0.002 0.003 -0.09** 0.004 -0.018 -0.013 -0.006 -0.015 --- -0.020 0.003 -0.291 -0.005 -0.014 
  (0.412) (0.472) (0.044) (0.414) (0.486) (0.505) (0.295) (0.362)  (0.245) (0.705) (0.514) (0.763) (0.523) 
GDPpc  Growth  --- 0.009 0.006 0.003 0.015 0.007 0.012 0.002 0.013 --- --- 0.018 0.181 0.040 0.011 
  (0.308) (0.601) (0.795) (0.501) (0.768) (0.393) (0.842) (0.359)   (0.289) (0.387) (0.284) (0.480) 
Rule of Law   --- -0.009 0.025 -0.415 -0.008 -0.093 -0.200 --- -0.197 --- --- -0.043 --- -0.111 -0.196 
  (0.668) (0.531) (0.322) (0.833) (0.715) (0.292)  (0.198)   (0.618)  (0.687) (0.322) 
Liquid Liabilities  --- -0.074 -0.137 -3.65*** -0.014 -0.120 -0.342 --- -0.450 --- --- 0.150 --- -0.460 -0.425 
  (0.543) (0.394) (0.004) (0.945) (0.836) (0.456)  (0.436)   (0.224)  (0.356) (0.299) 
Foreign Aid (DAC) --- --- 0.0003 --- 0.002 -0.002 -0.015 --- -0.018 --- --- 0.005 --- -0.027 -0.020 
   (0.974)  (0.588) (0.911) (0.504)  (0.443)   (0.405)  (0.567) (0.442) 
Inflation  --- --- -0.0004 -0.013 0.0001 -0.002 -0.002 --- -0.002 --- --- 0.001 --- -0.009 -0.001 
   (0.294) (0.149) (0.910) (0.127) (0.102)  (0.199)   (0.601)  (0.266) (0.104) 
                
AR(1) -1.062 -0.816 -1.492 -1.033 -1.224 -1.070 -1.042 -1.915* -1.034 -1.357 -1.037 -1.327 -1.004 -1.013 -1.034 
 (0.287) (0.414) (0.135) (0.301) (0.220) (0.284) (0.297) (0.055) (0.300) (0.174) (0.299) (0.184) (0.314) (0.310) (0.300) 
AR(2) -0.996 0.734 -0.935 -0.937 -0.988 -0.884 -1.099 0.304 -1.132 -1.227 -0.789 -0.921 -1.001 -1.092 -1.135 
 (0.319) (0.462) (0.349) (0.348) (0.322) (0.376) (0.271) (0.760) (0.257) (0.219) (0.430) (0.356) (0.316) (0.274) (0.256) 
Sargan OIR 1.007 3.111 6.043 5.279 4.002 4.692 10.614 3.333 15.647 2.232 1.784 17.049 8.641 10.380 24.748 
Wald 133*** 93.38*** 8.576 1616*** 4.629 2666*** 2144*** 4.684 3320*** 1.674 120.3*** 37.12*** 8715*** 10261*** 3333*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.477) (0.000) (0.865) (0.000) (0.000) (0.455) (0.000) (0.195) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Countries  5 10 14 14 13 15 22 9 25 4 7 23 10 19 28 
Observations  73 69 98 83 86 95 148 92 161 60 73 146 120 125 181 
                
***, **,*: significance levels of  1%,  5% and 10% respectively.  AR(2): Second Order Autocorrelation test. OIR: Over-identifying Restrictions test. Initial: lagged endogenous estimated coefficient.  
Wald: test for the joint significance of estimated coefficients. AC: Absolute Convergence.  CC: Conditional Convergence.  Yrs: Years. UMI: Upper Middle Income. LMI: Lower Middle Income. MI: 
Middle Income. LI: Low Income. English: English Common-law. French: French Civil-law. Christ: Christianity dominated countries. Islam: Islam dominated countries.  SSA: Sub-Saharan Africa.  NA: 
North Africa. Oil: Petroleum exporting countries. Non-oil: Countries with no significant exports in petroleum. Conflict: Countries with significant political instability. Non-co: Countries without 
significant political instability. Priv: Private. GDPpc: GDP per capita. DAC: Development Assistance Committee. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated 
coefficients and the Wald statistics. 2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(1) and AR(2) tests and; b) the validity of the instruments in the Sargan OIR 
test.
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2.2 Discussion of results 
Before we dive into the discussing the results, it is important first and foremost to 
understand the economic intuition motivating absolute and conditional convergence of capital 
flight in the African continent. Absolute convergence in capital flight occurs when countries 
share the same fundamental characteristics with regard to bases governing capital flight such that 
only cross-country variations in initial levels of capital flight exist. Absolute convergence thus, 
results from factors such as, inter alia: significant export of petroleum; political instability due to 
conflicts; the emphasis legal origin places on property rights, enforcements of the rights and fight 
against corruption; the manner in which economic prosperity affects the propensity by which the 
extra-wealth is saved abroad. Absolute convergence also occurs because of adjustments common 
to fundamental characteristics (conflict-affected, high-income or English common-law countries 
for example). Hence, based on the above intuition we could expect capital flight to be higher in 
petroleum and conflict-affected countries. This is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for 
speedy convergence because of disparities in initial conditions of capital flight. These differences 
in initial conditions depend on: (i) time-dynamic evidence of significant petroleum exports, 
either because of recent discovery or substantial decline in productions; (ii) spontaneous 
reoccurrence of conflicts after relatively stable periods or arbitrary and unilateral violation of 
peace accords and (iii) the diffusion of legal cultures transmitted by colonial powers over time 
through regionalization and globalization such that the legal origin fundamental holds less 
ground. 
 On the other hand, conditional convergence is that which is contingent on cross-country 
disparities in structural and institutional characteristics that determine capital flight. In 
accordance with the economic growth literature (Barro & Sala-i-Martin, 1992, 1995), conditional 
convergence depicts the kind of convergence whereby, one’s own long-term steady state 
(equilibrium) is contingent on structural characteristics and fundamentals of its institutions in 
particular  and its economy in general. For example, non-petroleum exporting countries may 
differ significantly in the level of globalization, institutional quality, economic prosperity, 
financial development,  price stability, foreign aid…etc To this end, our model for conditional 
convergence is contingent on institutional quality (rule of law and regulation quality), 
globalization (trade, FDI and private capital flows), financial development (at overall economic 
and financial system levels), economic prosperity (GDP growth at macro and micro levels), 
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inflation and development assistance (total NODA and NODA from DAC countries)
3
. Due to 
constraints in degrees of freedom, some models have not been conditional on all the 
determinants of capital flight outlined above. This is not a major issue because some conditional 
specifications in mainstream literature are limited to two macroeconomic control variables 
(Bruno et al., 2012).  
 We have observed the following from the findings. (i) Based on continental results, 
findings on ‘Petroleum exporting’, ‘North Africa’ ‘French civil-law’, ‘Middle-income’ and 
‘Upper-middle-income’ countries significantly affect the absolute convergence process. The 
corresponding lower (higher) rate (time) of (to full) convergence is the result of differences in 
initial conditions of capital flight. For instance, the difference in petroleum countries could be 
explained by significant variations in initial conditions of capital flight discussed above: time-
dynamic evidence of significant petroleum exports, either because of recent discovery or 
substantial decline in productions. (ii) Within the perspective of CC, but for the ‘Conflict-
affected’ and ‘Low-income’ countries results, African findings are broadly consistent across 
other fundamental characteristics. ‘Conflict-affected’ and ‘Low-income’ countries significantly 
have a higher (lower) rate (time required) of (for full) conditional converge because of 
substantially lower cross-country differences in macroeconomic and institutional characteristics 
determining capital flight. Hence, cross-country differences in factors governing capital flight 
among “Conflict-affected” and “Low-income” countries are not very substantial. (iii) Regardless 
of fundamental characteristic, from a projection date of 2010, a genuine timeframe for 
harmonizing policies is between 2016 and 2023. This empirically indicates that (both in absolute 
and conditional terms) countries with lower rates of capital flight are catching-up their 
counterparts with higher rates. Consistent with the intuition motivating this analysis on policy 
harmonization, two inferences could be drawn: (i) on the one hand, convergence implies that, 
adopting common policies against the scourge is feasible and  (ii) full (100%) convergence 
within the specified time horizon reflects the implementation (or harmonization) of the feasible 
policies without distinction of nationality or locality.  
 
3. Concluding implications and future directions 
An April 2015 World Bank report on attainment of the Millennium Development Goal (MDG) 
extreme poverty target has revealed that extreme poverty has been decreasing in all regions of 
the world with the exception of sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), in spite of the sub-region enjoying 
                         
3
 FDI: Foreign Direct Investment. NODA: Net Official Development Assistance. DAC: Development Assistance 
Committee.  
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more than two decades of growth resurgence.  This study builds on a critic of Piketty’s ‘capital 
in the 21
st
 century’ and recent methodological innovations on reverse Solow-Swan to review 
empirics on the adoption of common policy initiatives against a cause of extreme poverty in 
SSA: capital flight. The richness of the dataset enables the derivation of 14 fundamental 
characteristics of African capital flight based on income-levels, legal origins, natural resources, 
political stability, regional proximity and religious domination. The main finding reveals that 
regardless of fundamental characteristic, from a projection date of 2010, a genuine timeframe for 
harmonizing policies is between 2016 and 2023. In other words, the beginning of the psot-2015 
agenda on sustainable development goals coincides with the timeframe for common capital flight 
policies.  
Consistent with Asongu (2014), the following four points are relevant concerns that need 
to be resolved to facilitate this harmonization: improvement of the investment climate and ease 
of doing business to deter capital fight based on prospects of higher returns; formulation of 
common policies that would culminate in the repatriation of corruption-related capital flight 
deposited in Western banks and the improvement of formal institutions that will oversee the 
recuperation for this stolen capital (as well as deter potentially corrupt officials); involvement of 
Western banks in particular and the international community in general and; challenging the 
legitimacy of part of African debts. The purpose of this study has been to project more horizons 
for common policies against capital flight in Africa using more fundamental characteristics. 
More insights into policy measures against the underlying capital flight are available in Fofack 
and Ndikumana (2009), Boyce and Ndikumana (2011) and Asongu (2014).  
 Future studies devoted to extending extant literature may focus on more contemporary 
measures that are being tailored towards fighting illicit capital flight in the post-2015 sustainable 
development agenda. 
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